While rotation strategies are important in determining agricultural commodity supply and environmental benefits from land use, little has been said about the economics of crop rotation. An issue when seeking to identify rotation dominance is whether yield and input-saving carry-over effects persist for one or more years. Focusing on length of carryover, expected profit maximization, and the monoculture decision, this paper develops principles concerning choice of rotation structure. For some rules that we develop, rotations may be discarded without reference to price levels while other rules require price data. We also show how risk aversion in the presence of price uncertainty can alter preferences over rotations. A further consideration in rotation choice is the allocation of time. The problem of crop choice to manage time commitments through the crop year is formally similar to that of crop choice to manage profit risk.
Introduction
One of the defining features of crop agriculture throughout much of the world is the widespread practice of cropping in rotation. Crop rotations have been practiced since the beginning of agriculture, and some formal rules of thumb are known to have been practiced since medieval times. In order to support mixed farming and to avoid fouling fields, medieval estates in Sussex, England, applied a rotation of wheat, then barley (or oats), then legumes for sheep folding. These estates also grew intensive cereal crops followed by several years of grass (Brandon 1972) . Variants of the Dutch/Norfolk system of cereals (wheat, barley, or oats) interspersed with dung-nourished turnips, grass, and legumes to support livestock and replenish the soil were used in much of northern Europe by 1700 (Timmer 1969; Plumb 1952) .
Elsewhere in Europe, water was not as plentiful, and fallowing in rotation was the dominant cropping strategy through at least 1700. Newell (1973) and others hold that the replacement of fallow in rotation with forage crops during 1780-1850 was a major contributor to agricultural productivity growth in France by supporting additional animals and enhancing soil fertility. And the introduction of sugar beet to Continental Europe during the Napoleonic wars, to substitute for Caribbean sugarcane, required the practice of rotations of up to seven years (Poggi 1930 ).
In the United States, too, crop rotation strategies have been an important determinant of regional and crop sector success. Rhode (1995) reports the demise of monoculture wheat in California, eventually to be replaced by more sustainable orchard crops and by horticultural rotations. During the early part of the twentieth century, and partly in response to G.W. Carver's work and advocacy at the Tuskegee Institute, much of the South moved from predominantly monoculture cotton to cotton-based rotations that included peanuts and potatoes. Windish (1981) provides a history of the introduction of the soybean into the Corn Belt, circa 1920. Sugar beet rotations similar to those in Europe were found to be suc-cessful in the Upper Midwest (Stilgenbauer 1927) . Following the Dust Bowl in the southern Great Plains, the predominant monoculture wheat sequence was replaced by various rotations that often include sorghum and fallow with wheat (Baumhardt 2003) . Miller (2003) has documented growth in specialization on Iowa farms over the period 1880-2000, attributing it largely to technological change with emphasis on scale economies and improved market inputs that substitute for rotation effects. The decline of horsepower, lower costs of trade, and increasing market access have also allowed for increasing regional specialization. Within a region's mainstay crops, however, rotation choice is likely to remain a key determinant of profitability because many motives for use of rotations are likely to persist. Campbell et al. (1990) provide a list of private motives for using rotations. These include strengthening resistance to soil erosion and soil degradation, improving soil tilth, and also conserving scarce soil moisture. All of these were important motives for Great Plains cropping system adjustments after the Dust Bowl. Soil erosion is among the most serious risks facing global cropland productivity (Pimentel et al. 1995) , and land that is not desertified may require additional nutrient inputs to remain productive.
Pests and diseases are important reasons for rotating through potatoes, cereals, and legumes when sugar beet is the primary crop (Poggi 1930; Stilgenbauer 1927; Cai et al. 1997) , for rotating soybean with corn (Miller 2003) , and for including low-profit oats in wheat-based rotations (Campbell et al. 1990 ). In the case of sugar beet, nematodes can persist in the field for up to a decade, and nematicide use may not be permitted because of environmental side effects. Even if chemicals can control the problem, the approach introduces the risk of yield loss due to phytotoxic effects. As with the inclusion of soybeans in corn-based rotations, soil fertility can be enhanced by legume production and by incorporating cover crop organic matter residue into the soil. Organic matter also serves to protect the soil from erosion. Forage crops for grazing animals (turnips, or sugar beet tops as a by-product) can be important when seeking to access seasonally high prices and when alternative approaches to conserving feed are costly.
Growers have also expressed direct interest in using rotations because the practice is held to be consistent with sustainability. This has become important beyond the expression of private values or the desire to protect asset value. Public policies in the United States and in the European Union provide incentives to promote environmental goals, and market price premia are available for produce known to have been grown in a manner consistent with certain environmental standards.
Risk and cashflow management can also rationalize the use of rotations (Collins and Barry 1986; Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 1993) . While crop prices do have a systematic component, it is not so strong as to marginalize the relevance of a revenue diversification strategy. State contingent markets are available to growers in some countries and for some commodities, while government policies also provide income support. Growers having access to these opportunities do not, however, make the decision to diversify merely to manage risk or stabilize cash flow; they take it as part of a package with rotation effects and other merits.
A further private motive for use of rotations is to better manage labor supply through the year, noted as a problem in monoculture crop agriculture in regions with thin labor markets (Saloutos 1946; Campbell et al. 1990 ). Soybeans and corn, for example, are sown and harvested over sufficiently distinct periods that growers can better utilize labor, with less reliance on contract sources. Winter and spring variants of wheat and barley also allow for this latitude. Indeed, the significance of seasonal labor constraints in agriculture is borne out by the belief among some historians that it contributed to the nature of industrialization in manufacture (Sokoloff and Dollar 1997) and the pressures toward agricultural mechanization (Musoke and Olmstead 1982; Whatley 1987) .
Rotation effects in practiced rotations can also be adverse, at least for some crops in the cycle. Intensive cultivation under one crop may leave compacted soils for the next, while late harvesting may impede preparation for the follow-up planting. Volunteer plants in subsequent years are weeds and may carry disease. Perhaps the strongest adverse effect can be on accounting profit in some rotation years. Some rotation crops, such as oats throughout North America and spring barley in the Palouse region, are almost never grown in monoculture because market prices make it almost impossible to clear a profit over that part of the cycle.
Rotation strategies are of interest to policymakers for a variety of reasons. The public is also concerned about maintaining land quality, while wind-born particles are a health hazard. Siltation of lakes reduces the value of environmental amenities, while siltation of reservoirs and rivers require redress through public funds (Wang et al. 2002; Pimentel et al. 1995) . The risk and extent of flooding can be reduced by the more varied landscape that exists under diverse cropping (Pimentel et al. 1995) . Rotation choices are also seen to alter the use of agricultural chemicals, with attendant consequences for water quality (Wu et al. 2004) .
1 Rotations additionally can promote a more diverse ecosystem while reducing reliance on a chemical approach to pest management that may not be either efficient or sustainable (Cowan and Gunby 1996; Batra 1982) .
Because of concerns about global warming, participants in agricultural systems around the world may need to address their contributions to greenhouse gas emissions.
The United States emitted about 1,580 million metric tons of CO 2 in 2001, while Lal et al. (1999) estimate that the use of improved crop rotations and winter cover crops can mitigate this amount to the extent of about 5-15 million metric tons. When compared with afforestation, this approach is a low-cost approach to sequestration (but with limited sequestration potential) (Lewandrowski et al. 2004 Linear programming techniques were quickly adapted to accommodate crop rotation effects (Koopmans 1951) . While programming provides the means for empirical analysis, the framework does not appear to have been used to identify conceptual insights on the structure of rotations. Realizing that an understanding of dynamic interactions in dual analysis was needed to appreciate the role of incentives in such matter as soil capital formation, Chambers and Lichtenberg (1995) , Färe and Grosskopf (1996) , and others have developed empirically implementable dynamic models of production. Jaenicke (2000) has applied the approach, providing evidence in favor of the claim that soil capital matters for corn and soybean production in Rodale, Pennsylvania. Thomas (2003) has implemented a model in which carry-over effects can be estimated using farm choices and in which the optimality of rotations can be tested.
Stepping back from identifying rotation effects, the intent of the present paper is to ask what the consequences of given rotation effects are. Because the possible motives for rotation choice are many and interconnected, no single article could provide a comprehensive analysis. We confine attention to three general effects where the gains from specialization are opposed by some incentive to spread land across a variety of uses. We develop first a conceptual approach to identifying dominated rotations under input and output carry-over effects in the absence of risk aversion, and we identify rules of thumb for eliminating rotations. Under one-year rotation effects, the glue-on principle screens out the use of rotations by comparison with embedded rotations while the insert principle discards rotations involving immediate replications. These effects are purely structural, and neither relies on prices.
Under multi-year rotation effects, the sunk cost principle explores the roles of fertility accumulation and switching costs on length and composition of rotation. Working with rotations that have arbitrary rotation effects, the specialization principle invokes quasiconvexity in the objective function when seeking to maximize expected profit across rotation choices to identify the private optimality of monoculture. Both of these effects are price-dependent. The switching principle, which is price-independent, eliminates rotations relative to permuted rotations.
The second and third general effects that are studied concern gains from diversification in the presence of conditions that predispose solutions toward the interior. Under risk aversion, much of the earlier analysis carries through but with some qualifications. Since linearity is broken, rotation and monoculture strategies may be mixed in an optimal land allocation. Labor use diversification is also an issue when rural labor markets are thin.
Extending tools used in the analysis of risk preference effects, we model the extent of systemic correlations in demand for time across crops to identify when monoculture might apply. Neither effect necessarily requires crop rotations to rationalize diversification because one can diversify by growing a portfolio of crops sown under monoculture.
But if rotation effects are present, then risk and labor diversification effects can tip the balance away from monoculture. The paper concludes with some thoughts on further work in the area.
Concepts
One acre of land may be allocated to any among m crops, each of which uses the land for one year. ..
..
said to be in R , k u R , and we say that k u is a letter in the rotation. An adjoining set of letters in a rotation is referred to as a sequence, that is, .. ...
Throughout, we will denote a rotation by the least sequence length before repetition, that is, 1 2 u u ¢ ² and not 1 2 1 2 u u u u ¢ ².
The planting time expectation of harvest time output prices are exogenous to the farm at , where there is a 10 lb/acre nitrogen savings in addition to the five-bushel yield boost. For interior input choice solutions-and we make this assumption throughout the paper-profit that an accountant ignoring rotation effects might attribute to corn increases by 5 10 corn nitrogen P w due to rotation effects. As we will show, whether these spillover yield and input effects persist for one or more years into the future is important in determining what one can relate about the optimality of a particular rotation. We will develop our analysis first when spillover yield and input effects persist for one year (one-year memory), deferring the general case to later.
One-Year Memory
If the i u crop is followed by the j u crop in some rotation labeled R , then use the ro-
, is written as
The one-year memory is reflected in the fact that the effect does not depend upon crops before i u in the rotation. A natural restriction applies to these
tion. This restriction is merely to assert that wheat is not harvested in the year that alfalfa is grown in a wheat-alfalfa rotation.
Accounting profit for the j u crop following the i u crop in rotation R is
Average profit per year over the whole rotation is
where | | R is rotation length (years before rotation repeats) and 
Take a weighted sum to obtain
Definition 1, parts (a) and (b), allows us to adapt the histories for 1 R and 2 R to that for 3 R without losing step. The connections are seamless. But
so that the embedding rotation can have profit no larger than the largest among those of the embedded rotations. and one-year memory identify domination.
Duplicate Insertion Principle
Application of Definition 1 requires a sequence of two letters common to two rotations. Sometimes the idea of common sequences does not apply but the mechanism used to bond the two rotations remains relevant. When two rotations differ only by the inclusion of a repeated letter then the repetition creates a redundancy in the conditions specified in Definition 1. 
This observation allows us to assert the following. 
N-Year Memory
The main, tedious, and important distinction between N-year memory and one-year memory is that operator (; ) L R is no longer dependent only on the last chosen crop but rather on the last N crops. 
Rotation CCCS ¢ ² can be discarded because Result 2 applies under two-year memory if duplicate insertion is replaced by the idea of inserting a third consecutive year of the crop when the sequence had been just two consecutive years. But CCS ¢ ² can dominate CS ¢ ² and C ¢ ² under appropriate carry-over and price parameters. To verify this, assume that
. 
Because of profit function homogeneity, we may arbitrarily normalize one price without loss of insight. Let, : 
They are congruent: subtract the first from the second to obtain the third so that any solution to the first two also satisfies the third. With | Figure 2 . These preferences are driven entirely by the imposed carry-over effects, and one could choose carry-over parameter values such that preferred rotations on these three regions in output price space were interchanged.
EXAMPLE 5. (Sunk cost principle) As with the Sussex systems and some systems reported in Example 1, pasture and other perennial crops often enter a rotation. These crops may involve start-up (switching) costs because of low productivity in the first year, and switching costs will affect rotation structure. Suppose that crop A is perennial (pasture, alfalfa, etc.) while crop B is annual. Start-up costs for the crop amount to 0 K t . There are no rotation effects concerning the productivity of crop A, but there is a multi-year productivity effect under crop B. Specifically, the first year of crop B production after 
Differentiate, with the order indicated by the number of prime symbols, to obtain value
The first fraction at right must be negative for some positive natural number N if rotation . If the set is empty then there will never be an incentive to grow B in rotation. The set contracts as K increases and, for given price levels, there exists a ceiling value of K above which A ¢ ² is preferred. The second fraction in (12) is positive, and represents the marginal revenue from increased fertility in B when averaged over all rotation years.
A second differentiation gives
This is negative at any point satisfying 
General Analysis of Rotation Effects
Memory structure is not necessary for some conclusions to be made on optimal rotation choices. Two are what we call the specialization principle and the switching principle. In addition, we comment on the role of price homogeneity on the structure of rotation choices and how subsidies can affect that structure.
Specialization Principle
Monoculture is largely about gains from specialization. These gains can come in many forms, including the consequences of stronger incentives to develop crop-specific human capital. The sort of specialization we consider here is not in any way dynamic. It refers to the circumstances under which rotation effects are insufficient to dominate the discretion to specialize in one particular crop. Write the maximum among monoculture profits for crops in rotation R as
By the convexity and symmetry of the max{} function in (14), an application of Jensen's inequality provides
Specialization will certainly be preferred if the value ˆ( ) R m defined in (15) 
Taking the difference,
The inference from the comparison may be summarized as follows. Of course, the comparison cannot relate which crop, were it grown in monoculture, would dominate the rotation.
EXAMPLE 6. For the two-crop corn-soybean rotation, CS ¢ ² with C for corn, let
With C P and S P as output prices, then 
where baseline profit disappears upon taking differences under the permutation attribute.
An implication is Result 4. Figure 3 depicts the regions. When 0 I , then the (positive) prices that support
are in the wedge between two positively sloped rays from the origin. 6 This is an illustration of Result 4. Without a subsidy, the convex combination of any two points in the cone labeled CS ¢ ² must also be in the cone. Picking any point in the cone, all points on the ray from the origin and through it must also be in the cone. The subsidy shifts these rays in a parallel manner so as to expand the price set supporting CS ¢ ². When a subsidy is employed, then the convex property still applies but the ray property fails.
Returning to equation (17), let 5 be the set of permutations on 1 R . So for
, on the unit simplex for each rotation in 5 and generalize (17) to
If there exist simplex weightings , 
, and then R dominates 1 R for any positive prices.
( 1 3) 0;
( 1 4) 0;
( 1 5) 0;
( 1 6) 0.
Result 5 applies to ensure a sign on ( 1 2) R R and on each of the other conditions also. In general the whole set of conditions reduces to 0; 0; 0; 0; 0;
and is always satisfied for positive prices because the yield carry-overs for 1 R are very strong relative to those for the other rotations.
However, if we only change | 1
, then preference over rotations will have to be price dependent. In particular, (21) becomes 2 ; ; ; 0; 2 .
Without searching on the interior of the simplex, it is clear that rotation ACBD ¢ ² may be removed from further consideration regardless of the level of (positive) prices. We may continue looking for weights that support dominance of 1 R without needing to include 5 R in the calculations.
Risk Aversion Effect
Among the more widely cited motives for use of rotation strategies is risk diversification. We will investigate how rotation carry-over effects interact with diversification effects under the expected utility framework and one-year memory when the choice set is 
The increasing and concave utility function is [ ( )] U U * , the expectation operator over harvest prices is { } E < , and the planting date objective function is [0, 1] ( ) max
It is convenient to break the problem in two, writing 
We seek to establish conditions such that the optimal cropping strategy is clear. Define 
A A A P q c * , and then remove the action constraints:
The first-order conditions for the unconstrained problems are
but it is the corner solutions for the constrained problems that are of interest. In this regard, two definitions are in order. Define the harmonic mean of, say, Y , as E G P P G P P E G P P E G P P t for all non-decreasing functions 1 ( , )
A B G P P and 2 ( , )
A B
G P P such that the expectations exist.
This is a generalized form of correlation, and it does require that A P bear a positive linear correlation with B P . Positive association between these random variables is reasonable because commodity prices tend to covary positively. In the use we put the concept to, association ensures that diversification is not so effective that a mildly risk-averse individ- Case 1:
. By the association property on A P and B P , both of these conditions are certainly satisfied whenever 
Time Rationing
A further motive for use of rotations is workload management. The argument is that different crops have different seasonal workload requirements, and so growing a mix of crops could be more efficient than specialization. The motive concerns competing demands for resources (time, versatile machinery, working capital, etc.) and not temporal spillovers in crop productivity. To evaluate the argument, we ignore risk and introduce a seasonal labor cost function but otherwise adopt the model in the previous section.
There are J seasons in the year, and the seasons are denoted as 
Breaking the optimization problem in two, write
At this point, the analysis can proceed much as for the study of risk aversion. Conditions can be specified such that each of Cases 1 through 4 occurs.
We close with a point on the role of correlation among crop labor demands. To make explicit how labor requirement schedules affect the optimal solution, suppose that (a violation of statistical association), then there will be no corner solutions to (31) because the crop mix is very effective at stabilizing labor demand while other economic parameters are not such that they promote specialization.
Conclusion
Recognizing the importance of crop rotation for private profit and public policy, the intent of this paper has been to investigate some economics behind the choice. Our main model has provided some rules of thumb for choosing among rotations. General insights are that rotation carry-over can support quite involved rotations only if monoculture profits are narrowly dispersed and carry-over effects persist for several years. One exception is the case in which substantial fixed costs are incurred to initiate a crop while carry-over fertility effects on a secondary crop accumulate to a significant level over several years.
Then a dominant crop may be rotated with occasional planting of the secondary crop.
Things are not quite so straightforward under risk aversion in the presence of uncertainty because rotation and diversification effects can trade off such that mixing monoculture with rotations may occur. We also show that monoculture and mixing monoculture with rotations can be motivated by time rationing among crops.
We have noted in passing several other motives for choosing monoculture but have not developed the arguments. Nor have we engaged in any empirical studies to discriminate between motives. These are the logical next steps. The inavailability of commercial cropping choice data attached to relevant farm-level technology data may have been responsible in part for a paucity of research on the economics of rotation decisions to date.
8
Governmental data efforts in recent years, together with technical advances in the gathering and analysis of information, hold promise for discerning the relative importance of factors in determining rotation choices.
Endnotes
1. For the Upper Mississippi River Basin, Wu et al. (2004) found subsidies on rotations to have only a weak effect in altering practices to reduce run-off pollution.
2. Throughout, we assume that one crop is grown per year. This is a convenience to economize on the use of notation. 6. Linear homogeneity of the profit function ensures that the partitioning curves are rays.
7. Association is weaker, i.e., less restrictive, than the affiliation assumption that is widely used in auction theory (Shaked and Shanthikumar 1994, p. 254; Milgrom 1989 ).
8. Innovations in remote imaging allow reliable detection of agricultural subsidy fraud in which planting decisions are misrepresented (Mitchener 2004 ).
